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Training for Operation Jubilee
Tactics and Training in the Fusiliers Mont-Royal
and the Dieppe Raid, 1939-1942
Caroline D’Amours

A

t dawn on 19 August 1942, the
2nd Canadian Infantry Division
launched an attack on the French town
of Dieppe. Of the 4,953 Canadians
landed on the beaches at Dieppe, only
2,210 men returned to British soil at
the end of this fateful day. The raid
has captured the interest of historians
and broad audiences ever since
because it was the Canadian Army’s
first major European engagement of
war and because the tactical failure
of the raid was marked by high
casualties. Debates over the planning
and execution of the operation have
fuelled scholarly and popular interest
in the assault.1
Yet, despite the exploration of
new questions and sources in recent
years,2 few authors have focussed
on the training of the infantry that
participated in the operation. Existing
studies mainly look at the failure
of Yukon I and II, two large-scale
combined exercises in June 1942
whose objective was to rehearse the
operation. C.P. Stacey, the official
historian of the Canadian Army,
states that “Yukon [I] did not go
well. Units were landed miles from
the proper beaches, and the tank
landing craft arrived over an hour
late.”3 Several historians have echoed
Stacey’s critical assessment of the
exercises.4 Paul Douglas Dickson, who
mainly bases his analysis on the 1942
Combined Operations Headquarters
report, notes more specifically the

Abstract: The disastrous Dieppe Raid
of August 1942 has received a great
deal of attention from historians since
the end of the Second World War.
This article examines the training
given to officers of infantry units of
the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division
using the Fusiliers Mont-Royal (FMR)
as a case study. The article contends
that the infantry officers were not
ready, as their tactical training was
impeded by the absence of a common
doctrine, the lack of realism, and time
constraints. FMR’s junior leadership
therefore lacked speed, initiative,
and instinct, all vital elements for
an operation as risky as Operation
Jubilee.

need for such exercises to more
realistically replicate operational
conditions.5
The problem with these studies
is that they do not allow us to assess
the quality of the training at the unit
and sub-unit level. One exception
is Douglas Russell Benneweis’ MA
thesis, a case study of the South
Saskatchewan Regiment. He notes
the wide variation in the level and
extent of the training within the
Canadian battalions, a result of the
significant latitude left to the officers
in the implementation of training
programs. According to Benneweis,
there was also a lack of realism and
of standardized methods to assess the
training.6 However, his findings do
not dwell on the training with regard
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to the particular characteristics of
Operation Jubilee. Bill Rawling
discusses the training given to
Canadian battalions in Dieppe 1942:
La catastrophe, but he was more
reluctant to question its overall value.
He maintains that the commando
training received by the soldiers on
the Isle of Wight was essential and
particularly beneficial to men during
the operation.7 In his book Tragedy at
Dieppe: Operation Jubilee, August 19,
1942, Mark Zuehlke calls attention to
unit training, which took place almost
exclusively at the company level or
lower. According to him, choices
had to be made because of the lack of
time, which resulted in “virtually no
battalion-scale exercises and nothing
at all at the brigade or divisional
level” in the period before the Yukon
I and II exercises.8
In the end, these studies do not
provide a measure of the training
state of the junior leaders involved
in the raid, the ultimate architects of
unit effectiveness, especially in this
type of operation. This article will not
question the relevance and weight
of the various reasons developed in
the literature to explain the failure
of the Dieppe raid. Its intention is to
expand the scope of the discussion
by focusing on the training provided
to the units’ officers, employing as a
case study the Fusiliers Mont-Royal
(FMR). For the men of this unit, an
amphibious operation constituted a
17

1

Canadian Military History, Vol. 22 [2013], Iss. 4, Art. 3
type of operation with which they
were unfamiliar and which included
several activities outside their
normal duties. It is thus important
to understand how the unit’s officers
were prepared for the task that was
assigned to them on the beach at
Dieppe. In order to do that, one
needs to go back to the beginning
of the war and even a bit further to
be able to assess all of the factors
influencing the FMR’s training before
Operation Jubilee and to appreciate
the difficult enterprise the men had in
front of them. Before examining the
regiment’s preparation, it is useful to
begin with the operation and what
happened in the small coastal town
of Dieppe.

Operation Jubilee

T

first occupy Puys and Pourville to
neutralize the machine gun posts and
artillery batteries which protected the
beaches in front of Dieppe, as well as
destroy local targets. At 0520 hours,
the Essex Scottish Regiment and
the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry
(RHLI), along with tanks of the
Calgary Regiment, would launch a
frontal attack on Dieppe (Red and
White Beaches). The FMR and A
Commando Royal Marine would
serve as the floating reserve and
exploit any favourable situation in
addition to occupying the perimeter
in order to provide a protective
screen for withdrawing units who
had completed their tasks.9
The frontal attack began as
planned. Unfortunately, the RHLI
and the Essex Scottish were to open
the assault without the essential
artillery support of the tanks, since
the latter landed ten to fifteen
minutes late. In addition, the heavy

Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2013

he attack on Dieppe involved
nearly 5,000 men from
2nd Canadian Infantry Division

accompanied by a Canadian tank
regiment and British Commando
and Royal Marine troops. The plan
called for limited fire support from
Royal Navy (RN) destroyers and
squadrons of the Royal Air Force
(RAF). The first phase of the landing
would begin at 0450 hours. To the
east, No.3 Commando would launch
the assault at Berneval (Yellow
Beach) while the Royal Regiment
of Canada with three platoons of
the Black Watch (Royal Highland
Regiment) of Canada would push
towards Puys (Blue Beach). To the
west, No.4 Commando would rush
to Varengeville (Orange Beach) and
the South Saskatchewan Regiment
and the Queen’s Own Cameron
Highlanders of Canada would land
at Pourville (Green Beach).
The Commandos’ task was
to eliminate the German coastal
batteries on each side of Dieppe.
The Canadians’ objective was to
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A German photo taken immediate after
the Dieppe raid shows prisoners of war
from the Fusiliers Mont-Royal.

fire sustained by men on Red and
White Beaches made matters worse.
The flank assaults failed to wrest the
coastal batteries from German control
and the guns remained pointed at
the Dieppe beaches. These factors
combined to halt the Canadians at
Dieppe and only a few small groups
of men were able to infiltrate the city.
It was impossible to neutralize the
enemy and achieve the objectives.
According to the initial plan, the FMR
was supposed to concentrate on the
Parc Jehan Ango in order to cover
the withdrawal of other Canadian
units. Major-General J.H. Roberts,
commanding officer of 2nd Canadian
Infantry Division, observed the raid
from aboard HMS Calpe. Because
he had received ambiguous reports
that indicated the possibility of Essex
having entered the city, Roberts
ordered the FMR to land on Red
Beach. The new target became the
tobacco factory, which was supposed
to be in Essex’s hands.10
Around 0710 hours, the FMR
landing craft crossed the smokescreen.
The situation in front of them was
not, however, the one expected:
boats were scattered all along the
seafront because of the smoke, the
heavy fire and the currents. Because
of this, a considerable part of the
unit landed on White Beach. A and
C Companies landed on the narrow
strip of beach under the cliffs west
of the Casino while D and HQ
Companies landed ashore in front
of the casino. B Company was the
only one to have disembarked in
front of the tobacco factory on Red
Beach. Despite heavy losses, the
officers were trying, with difficulty to
regroup and organize their sub-units.
Although some FMR detachments
managed to enter the city during
the operation, most of the men
remained on the beach sheltering
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2013

from the heavy enemy fire. Therefore,
they became perfect targets for the
German troops. At 0930 hours, nearly
four hours and a half after the start
of the operation, it became clear
that none of the objectives would
be achieved. After some hesitation,
Roberts set the withdrawal for 1100
hours and this extremely difficult
task ended three hours later. For the
FMR, the operation was horrific – of
32 officers and 552 other ranks that
embarked for Jubilee, only 5 officers
and 120 men returned to England;
8 officers and 111 men were killed,
2 officers and 48 other ranks were
wounded and 19 officers and 225
other ranks were taken prisoners.11
Despite the flaws of the plan
and the fierce resistance encountered
during the landing it is appropriate
to question whether the men were
ready to deal with the inherent
complexities of Operation Jubilee. Of
course, members of the infantry unit
had to master the various technical
elements of amphibious operations:
the landing and re-embarkation
from a craft, swimming, handling
of light and heavy weapons as well
as explosives and long-range radios,
transporting of the wounded, in
addition to “hardening” training.
Furthermore, the men of the FMR
were also required to know the
tactical concepts related to this
type of operation such as technical

landing and embarkation through
a smokescreen, village fighting, and
night fighting. More specifically,
the infantrymen needed to become
familiar with cooperation with tanks,
the RN, and the RAF. Indeed, support
weapons belonging to the battalion
were not enough to cross the beach. It
was therefore necessary to master the
elements of the all-arms cooperation
to maintain heavy fire support to
suppress the enemy.12
On the other hand, the faulty
communication system between the
beaches, the RAF, ships, and tanks
during the operation had resulted
in a lack of fire support for the FMR
from the various services, causing
a significant number of losses even
before they arrived on the beach. This
same failure forced the unit and subunit commanders to improvise and
work without direction from their
superiors. Above all, the operational
role assigned to the FMR in Operation
Jubilee necessarily implied that the
senior and junior leaders possessed
great flexibility and initiative since
the unit may have been required to
strengthen any vital sector of the Red
and White Beaches. Thus, the question
is whether these officers were ready
to lead their sub-units on the beach
and to improvise leaving the beach as
quickly as possible. Speed, initiative
and instinct was therefore imperative
to allow companies to spread out as
19
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much as possible and then regroup
inland near their objectives. Thus, the
historian seeking to explain the level
of preparation of the FMR’s officers
needs to examine the pre-war state of
the Canadian Army.13

On the eve of the
Second World War

O

n 1 September 1939, General
Order 135 established the active
army. This directive affected, amongst
others, the FMR, one of the first
units of the Non-Permanent Active
Militia (NPAM) to be mobilized for
the Canadian Active Service Force.
However, before the Second World
War, the fighting value of the FMR
men was almost negligible. Political
and institutional elements affected
the establishment of effective training
within the unit.
The Canadian Militia had two
components: the Permanent Active
Militia (PAM) – the regular force
composed of professional soldiers,
and the NPAM – the part-time force.
From the earliest days of the war,
these two components suffered
from a severe lack of preparation.
Members of the PAM had a total of
about 4,000 men and 400 officers, but
completely lacked modern military
equipment. Since the end of the
previous war, Canada’s military had
a minuscule budget. The memories
of the massacres on European soil a
quarter of a century earlier maintained
pacifist sentiments as well as the idea,
or hope, of Canada being a “fire-proof
house.”14 The economic crisis of the
1930s reinforced the pattern of little
attention being placed on defence
matters. The memories of the divisions
within the Canadian population
over conscription in 1917 also led
Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie
King to essentially reject Canadian
rearmament until 1937. Budget
constraints and lack of attention to
the army thus partly explained the
general lack of preparation of the
Canadian Army.15
20
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For the FMR, the consequences
were significant. This lack of interest
in military affairs from both the
government and the population
made recruiting difficult. In the
case of the Montreal unit, between
1930 and 1939, regimental strength
wavered from 269 to 428 NCOs
and men with an average of 345,
approximately 50 percent of the
normal establishment. Compared
to other units of the NPAM, the
FMR’s size was fairly representative.
However, the regiment was much
larger than other Francophone units,
an impressive accomplishment
considering the small recruitment
pool in Montreal’s French Canadian
population who held generally
negative views of the military.16
These elements also played a role
in the recruitment of the Royal 22e
Régiment (R22eR), the Permanent
Force regiment that provided a
training cadre for teaching part-time
militia units of Military Districts 4
and 5. Historians Jean Pariseau and
Serge Bernier emphasized that the
R22eR faced significant recruitment
difficulties. Its average complement
of 14 officers and 390 NCOs and
other ranks in the inter-war period
did not allow for the development
of a cadre to lead in establishing
rigorous and effective training. The
situation did not improve on the eve
of war because, in 1939, the unit’s
strength only totalled 19 officers, 165
NCOs and other ranks.17 As a result
the manpower shortage severely
limited training opportunities for
Quebec’s part-time militia and
Permanent Force units. The small
French-Canadian training staff from
the R22eR compromised the quality
of training provided to other militia
units in Quebec.
Even if the number of recruits
was adequate or the budgets allowed
the supply of modern weapons,
the tactical knowledge transmitted
proved to be flawed. Since the R22eR
provided the training cadre for
Quebec part-time units like the

FMR, the tactical training given in
this unit formed the foundation
on which others built. According
to historian Yves Tremblay, these
activities were limited to “spit-andpolish,” physical training and closeorder drill. Individual handling of
weapons, target shooting and route
marches made up the rest of the
training. Clearly the training of the
regular soldier was quite limited.
By extension, one can believe that
training militia units followed a
similar but slower pace.18 According
to the regimental history of another
infantry regiment of the NPAM,
the Régiment de la Chaudière, it
seems that social activities during
the inter-war years formed the bulk
of the training while exercises were
limited mainly to the handling of
rifles. For the FMR, the findings from
the regimental history reading are
even more appalling: parades and
uniforms were the main interests of
their military activities.19
With regard to the officers,
their training also suffered from
limited recruitment and budgetary
constraints during the inter-war
period. Indeed, the lack of enlisted
recruits drastically reduced the
opportunities for officers to practice
the art of command or handling of
their men as well as implementation of
tactics. In one year, militia personnel
trained one or two nights a week in
addition to spending 15 days at the
annual summer camp if the state of
the commanding officer’s personal
finances and those of the unit allowed
for it.20 The FMR sent troops four
times to the annual exercises during
the decade preceding the war, for
an average of 175 officers and men
per year. From this figure, one must
question whether the number of men
sent in 1937 (one officer and nine other
ranks) enabled the advancement
of training, as most officers knew
nothing of the art of command.21
Historian David French has
shown that the preparation of British
regimental officers suffered from a
4

number of deficiencies including the
lack of opportunities to train properly.
In the 1930s, tactical training for
infantry officers was decentralized.
The situation was worse for the
infantry since, unlike other service
branches, it had no centralized
school. Since the Canadian Militia
started out in the British organization,
Yves Tremblay points out that the
same defects existed in the Canadian
training system. The infantry officers,
after being commissioned, went
directly to the regiment to learn how
to lead their men and were entirely
dependent upon their sergeant for
learning basic skills. This approach
also brought a large variation in
training value provided to the men
as well as in the interpretation of
tactical doctrine. Secondly, tactical
training given to reserve officers
generally remained low due to the
predominance of administrative
and disciplinary tasks developed
in the militia course. 22 Indeed,
Tremblay pointed out in an article
that “reserve officers of a higher rank
than lieutenant were virtually left to
fend for themselves, that is to say
that they had to read and interpret
the tactical brochures on which they
could lay the hand on or, for some, to
satisfy themselves with summaries
appearing in the Canadian Defence
Quarterly.”23
In short, the level of training
given to the FMR men until the
Second World War proved to be
poor. It shows that the status of the
NPAM at the outbreak of the war
was relatively limited. Indeed, in
1939, several candidates of the FMR
were rejected for medical reasons.
In addition, many men would serve
as a cadre to form the second-line
battalion. This explains why, at the
announcement of mobilization in
1939, the number of FMR was even
lower than its actual peacetime
strength. Moreover, the FrenchCanadian regiment only had 227
soldiers, including 26 officers, when
the mobilization order came in.24 The
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2013
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Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Grenier commanded the FMR at the start of the war. Though
he had fought on the Western Front with the Royal 22nd Regiment, he was not up to
the task of commanding the FMR in the Second World War.

FMR would have had to recruit and
train about three quarters of their
establishment before they had been
ready to take the field. It is important
to note that the tactical training
provided to officers who would
themselves be training Canadian
force units was particularly low in
both theory and practice until the
eve of the conflict. Of course, the
Canadian government based its
policies on the British wait-and-see
strategy, but the fact remains that it
took at least 18-24 months of training
to really be able to cope with the
German Army.25

Lieutenant-Colonel
Grenier’s era

T

he combat capability of the FMR
depended upon the quality of the
officers and their ability to train the

men to perform the tasks they had
to undertake. However, the state of
readiness of the FMR’s officers at
the beginning of the conflict was
lamentable. At the outbreak of war,
lack of accommodations, shortages
of uniforms, weapons, ammunition,
vehicles, and training sites explained,
in part, the inadequate start-state of
training in the FMR as well as many
of the other units and formations of
the Canadian Active Service Force.26
The comments from one of FMR’s
sergeant-instructors are particularly
interesting in this regard:
[I] was theoretically in charge of the
anti-tank platoon, responsible for
defence of the battalion with six antitank guns called “two pounders.”
My men soon knew theory of parts,
nomenclature, assembly and stops,
and the commands because we

21
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managed to get an instruction book
for this gun. But we had neither
guns nor their gun tractors. There
were also three trucks for the whole
battalion! We had no ammunition.
What was so funny, it was to make a
semblance of manoeuvre, in front of
a picture of the gun, because we had
no gun! Try therefore under these
conditions to maintain the interest
of soldiers!

27

After Montreal and the unit’s
brief period of training at Camp
Valcartier (only one month in June
1940), the FMR soldiers went directly
to garrison duty in defence of Iceland.
Their main task was to support the
building of the Kaldadarnes airport
and a network of trenches, as well
as various island-defence schemes
which drastically limited training
opportunities. Physical training,
parade drill, rifle training and route
marches constituted the bulk of the
routine. Activities necessary for
the defence of Iceland interrupted
the rhythm of individual training
between July and October 1940. In
fact, this meant that basic individual
training would only resume in
September of 1940. In short, when
the FMR troops set foot in the United
Kingdom in November 1940, none
of them could boast that they had
completely mastered the basic skills
normally taught in a maximum time
period of 12 weeks. Then again, the
problems arising from a harried
mobilization and tasks in defence of
Iceland do not entirely explain FMR
training deficiencies.28
The inexperience of the battalion’s
leadership was another stumbling
block. The FMR officers generally had
no military knowledge because of the
poor state of militia training during
the interwar period. With the war
beginning, one would have thought
that the training of junior officers
would progress quickly. It did not
help that Lieutenant-Colonel Paul
Grenier, the commanding officer of
the regiment, was not up to the task
22
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of correcting training deficiencies.
Grenier was born in Montreal in 1893,
joined the army as a lieutenant in 1915
and served in France and Belgium
with the R22eR where he was badly
wounded at Passchendaele. By the
end of the war, he was a captain.
Between the wars, Grenier stayed in
the NPAM where he was promoted
to major in 1928. He was the FMR’s
second in command from 1934 until
he took command of the unit in early
1938 at age 45 when he was promoted
to lieutenant-colonel.29
According to his personal
military files, he never passed the
Militia Staff Course and he only
attended the Senior Officer’s Course
in January and February 1941.
He did not really excel at Senior
Officer School even if the school’s
commandant, Brigadier W. Robb,
was enthusiastic about Grenier’s
personality. In a report, Robb stated
that he was unsure about his tactical
knowledge but put the blame on the
question of language. 30 However,
when British Lieutenant-General
Bernard L. Montgomery, commander
of the South-Eastern Command in
England, reviewed the Canadian
units and their commanders in the
spring of 1942, he concluded that
Grenier was a poor leader. Indeed, in
Montgomery’s mind, the “weak link
in this [Brigade] is the [FMR].” He
placed much of the fault on Grenier’s
shoulders as he said that he did not
“believe that Grenier has the military
knowledge and professional ability
to produce a good and well-trained
[battalion]. He has commanded the
[battalion] for over 5 years and is
nearly 50 years old. He should really
be replaced by a better and younger
man.”31 Lieutenant-General H.D.G.
Crerar (GOC I Canadian Corps) also
expressed such an opinion in a letter
to Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart
(Chief of the General Staff), which
contended:
his tactical abilities are open to doubt
and may well prove inadequate

during the approaching tests of unit
and formation exercises in which
case we shall need to dispose of his
services that account. Further while
he was in commanded [of] his unit for
some six years both past and current
Brigade [commanders] and [Division
commander] here have indicated
their inability to recommend him for
further promotion in field.32

The training given to officers
and other ranks thus suffered
from Grenier’s deficiencies as a
commander. First, the training lacked
realism. All the instructions were
given in form of lectures with no
effective follow-up tactical exercises
without troops (TEWTs) or field
training exercises to apply what
had been learned. Furthermore, it
is quite obvious when one looks at
the war diary that the battalion’s
officers received very limited specific
training to improve their individual
skills. During the 31 months that
Grenier was in command of the FMR,
four TEWTs were the only training
dedicated to his officers. Of those
exercises, only one was given by
Grenier on the subject of a company
in the attack; another was led by
the commanding officer of Calgary
Regiment (Tank), Lieutenant-Colonel
J.G. Andrews, on tank-infantry
cooperation; and the last two others
were given by unit junior officers on
the defence of a village and on the
appreciation of the ground.33
However, the FMR’s officers
had to absorb a significant amount
of knowledge in order to practice
minor tactics and fieldcraft. As
historian Timothy Harrison Place
noted, “such highly practical skills
cannot readily be mastered by booklearning alone.” 34 Unfortunately,
most of the training received by
officers and NCOs in these areas
was theoretical. This was clearly
insufficient for junior leaders charged
with leading others into battle.
These exercises did not allow for
the reproduction of the sounds and
6
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confusion of the battlefield. This
meant that the FMR officers were
lacking both the depth of military
expertise and tactical knowledge
about modern warfare. Therefore,
opportunities for improving the
tactical knowledge of the unit’s
officers fell almost exclusively on
the training obtained outside the
battalion. Thus, it was essential that
officers have the opportunity to take
courses offered by the Canadian and
British armies in England.35
Y e t , a ccor di n g t o t h e u n i t
war diary, from the beginning of
mobilization to November 1940, only
one officer had passed the Militia Staff
Course and one junior officer went to
the Infantry Company Commanders’
Course. Until the Dieppe raid, the
FMR’s war diarist noted that only
two other officers went to the Infantry
Company Commanders’ Course,
while one attended the Junior War
Staff Course and another went to
the Canadian Corps Junior Leader
School. If one focuses on the military
records of officers killed in action
during the raid, one can see that
the situation did not improve with
time. Of the six files available for
consultation, one had attended the
Infantry Company Commanders’
Course and only one other had
passed through the Canadian Junior
Leader School.36
The small number of subaltern
officers who attended the army
courses seemed to slowly improve
unit’s collective training. However,
training varied widely from company
to company under Grenier’s direction.
While some companies lingered
on elementary individual training,
others conducted diverse tactical
training, which started in May and
June 1941. Company exercises in
attack, defence, and withdrawal
began to emerge in the better-led subunits. The small number of officers
who attended courses between
November 1940 and November
1941 meant that most of the unit’s
junior officers were dependent on
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2013

the knowledge and skills of their
commanding officer to improve
their own individual capacity, which
partly explained the wide variations
in their tactical and leadership skills
as well as those of the sub-units they
led.37

New training initiatives

their weapons. In modern war,
with its more powerful weapons
and greater decentralization, the
responsibility of the individual has
been increased and he therefore
requires a far higher degree of
individual initiative than was
formerly necessary.
Commanders must do all that
they can to encourage initiative

I

f they wanted to improve their
tactical knowledge, the regiment’s
senior and junior officers could
turn to official doctrine stated in
the training pamphlets produced
by the British Army. Unfortunately,
the theoretical knowledge provided
by the pamphlets had some
shortcomings. At the end of the First
World War the British Army had
recognized that firepower dominated
the battlefield. To be able to advance
on the battlefield it was necessary to
combine firepower with movement.
To achieve this, the British favoured
a creeping barrage as a means for the
infantry to advance at a short distance
from the enemy. Canadian tactical
doctrine, on the eve of the Second
World War still embraced the need
to consolidate gains on the battlefield
before exploiting success. The aim
was to minimize losses arising from
any offensive movement. Therefore,
Allied attacks would always be very
slow and bound to the constraints of
artillery fire plan.38
The state of British and Canadian
doctrine in the summer of 1939 is best
explained by a 1937 army pamphlet
entitled Infantry Training: Training
and War, which was the last pre-war
infantry doctrinal literature available
for subaltern commanders until early
1941. Here, one can see that the ideal
to which soldiers were to aspire was
based on a doctrinal dichotomy:
initiative was encouraged while
discipline and obedience were also
emphasized.
In all wars soldiers have been
required who are disciplined,
physically fit and skilled with

and individuality, remembering
always that these must be
disciplined.39

Yet, the rapid and unexpected
German victory over France in
the spring of 1940 highlighted the
British Army’s slow tempo in action,
due to outdated tactics and lack
of initiative at all levels, as well
as the German Army’s superior
training. The introduction of machine
guns and tanks on the battlefield
meant that soldiers had to disperse
to survive. This also meant that
from that point on, decision-making
capacity was needed by all soldiers.
This required initiative, intelligence
and military knowledge.40 The British
Army’s outdated doctrine was
particularly evident in the system
of autocratic command and control
that stifled initiative at all levels.
Indeed, this convinced some British
and Canadian military officers of
much needed changes in the battle
doctrine, organization and training
for the armed forces.41
As head of the British I Corps
after Dunkirk, Lieutenant-General
Harold Alexander spread the use of
tactical training drill in his formation.
The publication of a pamphlet, I
Corps Tactical Notes, in the fall of
1940 favoured the dissemination of
this tactical guide for soldiers. The
War Office, after some resistance,
published the pamphlet in February
1941 under the title Tactical Notes
for Platoon Commanders. Although
Alexander’s foreword was omitted
and there was no reference to the
term “battle drills,” the aim of the
pamphlet published by the War
23
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Library and Archives Canada PA 132456

Opposite: Canadian troops taking part in
Battle Drill training, England, December
1941.
Top right: Canadian soldiers race along
a riverbed while conducting assault
training at Aldershot, England in August
1942.
Bottom right: A Vickers gun crew
relocates their weapon during training
in June or July 1942.

Office was to serve, as a tactical
guide for platoon commanders and,
in this way, was a step towards
improvement.42 In this document, the
author of the pamphlet mentioned
the lessons of the events of 1939-1940
presented above, and added that

Library and Archives Canada PA 177140

Library and Archives Canada PA 190158
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To-day, against an exceedingly
quick and bold opponent who relies
for success on surprise in the form
of rapid infiltration, we shall find
ourselves at a grave disadvantage
if we cannot be as quick, bold,
and enterprising as he is…Let us,
therefore, keep before our eyes this
guiding principle – SPEED. Speed
in making up our minds, speed
in delivering our orders, speed in
reconnaissance, and, finally, speed
in execution.43

Battle drill was a method of
teaching minor infantry tactics and
fieldcraft that emphasized fire and
movement and was directly aimed
at section, platoon and company
leaders. It was a flexible type of
training where soldiers rehearsed
situations encountered on the
battlefield. The acquisition of a
tactical instinct was the fundamental
objective of battle drill so that junior
officers and NCOs were able to
adapt to circumstances faced in real
combat. As such, battle drill broke
down manoeuvres into a series of
basic movements – a very important
aspect that made it different from
other training methods. In practice,
the objectives of battle drill were to
enhance the physical capabilities of
individual soldiers; to show them
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2013

how to use the ground, to maximize
the use of small arms and to teach
them teamwork from the section
upward. Battle drill also implied
improved realism in the exercises and
the introduction of battle inoculation
to prepare troops for the sights and
sounds of war. 44 Both theoretical
and practical exercises of increasing
complexity were introduced on topics
as varied as village fighting, street
fighting, river-crossings, attacks of all
sorts and night movement.45
Still, John English, in his study
The Canadian Army and the Normandy
Campaign, is more critical of this
form of training. According to him,
the battle inoculation aspect was
pushed to the extreme by trying to
bring the soldiers to “kill joyfully.”

English questions the value of the
use of live fire since nothing can
replace the experience of being shot
at with the intent to kill. In addition,
he argues that battle drill was a
training method that was too rigid
and impeded the junior officers’
tactical understanding. English might
be correct on the battle inoculation
flaws, but is not on the tactical
rigidity of this training method. The
primary purpose of battle drill was to
instill initiative and independence to
junior leaders as a way of surviving
on the battlefield.46
Battle drill was introduced
in the Canadian Army when the
2nd Canadian Division worked
with the 47th (London) Division
during the summer of 1941. The
25
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Canadian Forces photo ZK-28

(RMC) in Kingston. He
Calgary Highlanders sent
graduated from the RMC
some officers to attend
in 1932 and received his
demonstrations of this
lieutenant’s commission
new tactical method
in 1936 in the R22eR. He
in October. Upon their
served in India from 1938
return, they prepared a
to 1940 where he took
similar training course
part in the Waziristan
which was taught to all
campaign with the
platoons and companies
South Waziristan Scouts.
of the regiment. From
After being promoted
November 1941 onward,
to captain in 1939, he
the regiment received
was assigned to the 2nd
members from other
Division HQ as liaison
Canadian regiments.
officer in mid-1940 and
In fact, one can see that
went overseas with this
2nd Division’s Training
formation. In June 1941,
Instruction No.6 dated
he was promoted to major
28 November 1941
and transferred to the
focussed on the need for
R22eR before returning to
individual training and
Canada to take the Junior
specifically mentioned
War Staff Course at RMC.
that special attention
He spent a short period at
should be placed on the
8th Brigade headquarters
Tactical Notes for Platoon
before given command
Commanders pamphlet
of the FMR in April
as well as on battle drill
1942. At the age of 29,
training.47
Lieutenant-Colonel Dollard Ménard replaced Grenier in April 1942
and immediately instituted a more rigourous training program for
he was the youngest
Six FMR officers
the
regiment.
lieutenant-colonel in the
attended battle drill
Commonwealth.51
courses from November
the new tactical exercises against
1941 to May 1942 and the unit began
From the start, Ménard turned
an “opponent” – a specialized
battle drill training from January 1942
the battalion’s routine upside-down.
group of instructors playing the
onward. This new type of training
First, he evaluated his officers and
role of the enemy – enabled a better
worked well and was received
replaced those who were underunderstanding of desired responses.
positively by men as additional
trained or unfit. He took charge of
In fact, from the company level down,
officers returned from battle drill
officer and NCO training, something
decisions were measured in seconds,
courses to share what they had
that Grenier had never done. Officers’
not after lengthy consideration and
learned.48 The unit war diarist noted
days were held every week, during
so that type of training was much
which he showed them, amongst
at the beginning of March 1942 that
needed.50
other things, how to train their men.
“More and more, a greater number
The battalion war diary entry of 27
of officers are sent on these courses
Despite all these improvements
April is particularly interesting in this
(Battle Drill) from where they come
in the unit’s training, there would
regard and says much about the lack
back with new and better ideas from
be a more drastic change in April
of officer training prior to Ménard’s
which the Unit will greatly improve.
1942. When Lieutenant-General
arrival. “An ‘Officer’s Day’ has been
It is hoped that this Battalion will
Montgomery reviewed the Canadian
held today and this new kind of
shortly arrive to a very high standard
units and their commanders that
training was enjoyed by all Officers.
of training.”49 The introduction of
Spring, he concluded that Grenier
Much enthusiasm has been shown
was a poor commander. To remedy
battle drill allowed the dissemination
in the preparation of the discussion
this situation, Crerar appointed
of a common understanding of the
and T.E.W.T’s.”52 Subjects covered
Lieutenant-Colonel Dollard Ménard
doctrine at lower command levels.
to replace Grenier. Ménard was born
For the men and officers of the
by Ménard in the next months were
in Montreal in 1913 and studied
FMR, it was a welcome change to
varied, in direct line with the battle
business at Université Laval before
the dull training regimen that had
drill guidelines, and focussed on
enrolling in the Royal Military College
been in effect since 1939. Moreover,
minor tactics, namely verbal orders,
26
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n anticipation of Operation Rutter,
the original plan to attack Dieppe,
the men of the FMR arrived on the
Isle of Wight on 19 May 1942 where
they would become “a first class
‘Assault’ Unit of the highest quality”
according to the unit’s war diary.53
Amphibious operations constitute
one of the most complex types of
operations. The majority of the forces
which took part in Operation Jubilee
were completely unfamiliar with
tasks they had to perform and had
to be given special training to ensure
cooperation between the various
services besides familiarizing all
individuals with operations of this
nature.54
The training program for the
2nd Infantry Division provided
a progression in three phases:
technical instructions, tactics related
to amphibious operations, and a
last stage to progressively integrate
large-scale exercises with all the
components participating in the final
operation. For men of the FMR, the
technical training had to be alternated
with the tactical training probably due
to time constraints and administrative
work resulting from sending the
reconnaissance detachment too
shortly before the arrival of the
Though tanks played an important role
in Operation Jubilee, little combined
arms training took place before the raid.
Above right: Churchill tanks line up for
an inspection during an assault training
exercise in July 1942.

more theoretical training where men
became familiar with the concepts
related to amphibious operations
while including progressively
practical exercises. In the case of
the FMR, emphasis during this
period was placed on landing and
embarkation exercises, demolition
and heavy explosives, and village
fighting in addition with battle
drill. Like other units of Simmer
Force – 2nd Division’s name for this
operation – special attention was paid
to physical fitness, the aim being the
ability to walk nearly 18 kilometres
in full assault kit in 120 minutes.
However, on 28 May, the training

Library and Archives Canada PA 116274

Simmer Force: Combined
operations training

remainder of the division. Therefore,
the unavailability of training
areas, the lack of ammunition and
equipment as well as the paperwork
that had to be completed during
the first week on the island caused
several cancellations and changes
in the training program.55 As such,
2nd Division’s first training report
is most telling about the training
problems: “If training cannot go
forward more steadily than it has in
the past, training in some units will
not be complete by the time exercises
are ready to commence.”56
Thus, the period between 20 May
and 12 June stood out for its use of

Library and Archives Canada C-138689

the use of the ground, and the making
of a plan. In short, he improved and
standardized training through the
whole battalion, an essential change
before beginning a much more
elaborate training programme.

Below right: A Churchill from the Calgary
Tank Regiment exits a tank landing
craft during Exercise Yukon I, 11-12
June 1942.
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Officers of Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal photographed in June 1942 during the Simmer Force training on the Isle of Wight. LieutenantColonel Ménard is seated in the centre; Major J.R. Painchaud, the unit’s second-in-command is seated to the left of Ménard. Eight
of the officers in this photo were killed during the raid.

report indicated that “In the assault
courses, troops were able to complete
the course but were, in many cases,
unable to fight or fire effectively
when finished.”57 This would explain
why the training report of 6 June still
lingered on the physical condition of
the men. This same report indicated
that “The condition of the men has
improved and better results have
been secured from speed marches
but it has become evident that in the
short time available, training to the
standard required is not possible
without sacrificing other valuable
training.”58
Therefore, little room was
made for “valuable training” such
as all-arms cooperation, a major
shortcoming in regard to the limited
focus on this particular aspect
since the beginning of the war and
the role of fire support during the
assault on Dieppe. Besides landing
exercises, which necessarily involved
members of the navy, no exercise
was done in collaboration with the
14th Army Tank Regiment (Calgary
Regiment) or the RAF for this period.
In addition, on 21 May some expected
tactical situations such as street fight
28
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exercises were carried out under
the command of NCOs, while the
officers acted as umpires. It was
difficult then for officers, especially
for young officers, to learn how to
manage their sub-unit in these tactical
situations not to mention having to
increase their own initiative on the
battlefield.59
On 2 June, a larger exercise, Mox,
gradually increased the realism of
the training even though it did not
involve enemy fire. Mox’s principal
objective was to “practise the
landing of a raiding force who had
to go 1 or 2 miles inland to effectuate
tasks previously detailed and then
withdraw to its boats.” The men
of FMR were conducting their first
assault under the command of Major
J.R. Painchaud, second in command
of the unit. On the same day, a
second landing at Colwell Bay was
also planned at noon where the unit
had to complete the assault of a cliff.
According to the unit’s war diary,
“The first landing went very well
same as withdrawal, the only points
which were feeble was [sic] few subunits bunching on the beach and so
other losing temporarily direction

in the dark.” This observation is
particularly interesting, especially
when one knows that no enemy
defended the beach and, therefore,
the men of the FMR were not under
fire.60
The first training test was done
during the night of 11-12 June with
Exercise Yukon. It was created with
the operational plan in mind and was
therefore designed to practice the
technique and details of Operation
Rutter. Thus, all units involved were
practicing their roles on a stretch of
coastline at West Bay near Bridport in
Dorset County which looked similar
to the Dieppe area. Three tasks were
given to the FMR. The unit was to
land on a beach and then establish
a protected area for units that
had to withdraw after completing
their tasks. Then, the FMR would
constitute a reserve that could be sent
against any dangerous point on Red,
White or Green beaches on division
commander’s orders. Finally, the
unit had to cover demolition teams in
operation in the West Bay Harbour.61
Even though Yukon began as
scheduled at 0500 hours, the rest of the
operation was not going according to
12
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plan. Several units landed miles away
from the beaches and landing craft
transporting the tanks arrived more
than an hour late, which resulted
in major chaos on the beaches. The
delay in the landing and the slow
pace of the infantry advance inland
caused problems in the achievement
of the objectives. The FMR landed
on Red Beach at 0715 hours, its
four companies reaching their
objectives after searching buildings
and destroying all remaining enemy
defences. The men remained on
the beach for nine hours holding a
protective perimeter to cover the
withdrawal of other regiments.
The battalion then progressively
reduced its perimeter before battalion
headquarters and platoon rearguards
final re-embarkation under the
protection of a smokescreen.
However, problems met in Yukon
forced the military authorities to
put in place another rehearsal to
allow for additional training before
undertaking Operation Rutter. On 23
June, Yukon II was carried out at the
same place. Though it was slightly
better than the first exercise, the lack
of precision as to the time and place
of landing as well as the use of smoke
still complicated its execution for
some units.62
The purpose of these exercises
was to achieve maximum realism
while at the same time coming
as close as possible to simulating
conditions which would occur during
the actual operation. To do this,
the landing took place under an
important simulated aerial bombing.
Indeed, explosives were attached to
an underwater wire, which if hit by a
boat triggered a blast. Machine guns
and snipers fired as close as possible
to the assault troops in addition to
using mortars to familiarize young
These images, found in the FMR’s
war diary, show various aspects of the
Regiment’s participation in the Yukon
exercises.
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Top left: FMR soldiers await evacuation
from the beach following the conclusion
of Exercise Yukon.
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Middle left: Tank landing operations
during Exercise Yukon II, 22-23 June
1942.
Bottom left: An officer and two men from
the FMR train at Newpound Common, 7
August 1942.

soldiers with the sounds of modern
warfare and to teach them to keep
their heads down.63
If the Yukon exercises were
trying to recreate the most realistic
conditions possible, the goal was
not always achieved. First, the
information obtained on the defence
of Dieppe showed that the city
was protected by “low-category
troops amounting to one battalion,
with 500 divisional or regimental
troops in support, making no more
than fourteen hundred men.” 64
These were second-class troops
who were expected to be 40-45
years old. Therefore, for Yukon I
and Yukon II, an important and
systematic defence was not part of
the plan, as the role was assigned
to a single battalion of local Home
Guard troops. Furthermore, when
the dummy aerial attack was carried
out by Hurricanes, these local troops
carefully took cover, which facilitated
the advance of the assault units in the
frontal attack.65 It is probably for this
reason that an NCO from the FMR
observed that when they landed
on Red Beach during Operation
Jubilee: “Everybody expected that
we could land, take a position, and
begin to shoot. That was not what
happened.”66
Another important factor for the
FMR was that the only operational
role they practiced during Yukon I
and II was the protection of other
units’ withdrawal. No reference
was found in the war diary that
referred to a situation where the
FMR was sent into a specific area as
a reserve to support the advance of
14
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Canadian troops practice assault landings, July 1942.

another unit. Indeed, the FMR were
ordered during Operation Jubilee to
disembark and support the attack of
the Essex Scottish Regiment at Red
Beach near the tobacco factory. This
role involved flexibility, initiative,
and instinct by junior leaders to avoid
the beach becoming a killing zone
under enemy fire. However, this was
never practiced during the Yukon
exercises.67
Thirdly, British Army
amphibious operational doctrine
put great emphasis on the support
of tanks during a landing against
a defended beach. However, the
FMR did not train with the Calgary
Regiment before Jubilee. Given their
more static role on the cover of the
withdrawal phase, the FMR did not
advance inland in conjunction with
the tanks. Indeed, the latter were
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2013

ordered to land on the beach and
form a bridgehead in support of the
infantry. Yet, the FMR’s operational
role during the attack of Dieppe
necessarily required collaboration
with tanks since the unit could not
overwhelm the enemy with its own
weapons and needed armoured
fire support. Despite the various
shortcomings of Exercises Yukon I
and II, Operation Rutter was set to
take place during the first period
of favourable weather between 2
and 8 July. Since the weather never
improved, the raid was cancelled.
The operation was revived under
the code-name Jubilee and had the
disastrous consequences we all know
about today.68

*****

From 1939 to 1942, the men
of the Fusiliers Mont-Royal began
a drastic transformation of their
training methods. The publication
of the pamphlet Tactical Notes for
Platoon Commanders in early 1941 and
the introduction of battle drill in the
training routine of officers and men
of the FMR late in 1941 were critical
improvements. Officer training
improved significantly with the
arrival of Lieutenant-Colonel Ménard
who introduced more systematic
training to increase their leadership
and tactical understanding. This
progress was also a result of the
changes Crerar introduced in I
Canadian Corps’s training policy in
1942. Before the assault on Dieppe,
corps training instructions had
already stressed the importance
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of infantry-tank cooperation,
individual weapons competence
and the importance of training junior
leadership.
Yet, it has to be understood that
those “new” concepts of training were
introduced in the FMR’s training
program nearly two years after
the onset of the war and only eight
months before the raid. The uneven
training standards and methods
presented within the unit can be
explained, in large part, because in
the period of time before 1942, the
FMR’s senior officers were allowed to
decide for themselves how to apply
the doctrine and train their troops.
In fact, it was only in August 1942
that the development of a common
doctrine on training methods was
established as a training standard
and then reiterated in the training
instructions of October 1942 and
April 1943.
That Crerar had yet to stress the
importance of having a common
doctrine after three years of conflict
seems distressing. The Canadian
military’s effectiveness was
compromised by the inability of
infantry officers to convey the lessons
learned in the first years of the war
as we have seen here. Thus, when the
combined training was introduced
in the Spring of 1942, 2nd Division’s
infantry officers had to learn the
techniques and tactics of such a
complex type of operation in addition
to performing their regular duties.
Whether they really mastered all of
the elements is another question.
This probably explains why, after
the raid, the combined operations
training and exercises, individual
and junior leadership initiatives
as well as the use of fire support
were given primary importance.
Specific consideration was given to
beach landings, the establishment of
beach bridgeheads and operations at
brigade and battalion levels against
enemy-defended localities, especially
in towns and villages. Perhaps those
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questions were the true lessons
learned on this very tragic day. Thus,
the next time the Canadians attacked
the Atlantic Wall they would be
better prepared for the fight.69
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